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AbstractThe establishment of autonomous agencies has been a strong trend in the public sector across countries for about 25 years. In line with the official rhetoric accompanying such reforms, almost all reform evaluations have focused on various kinds of performance improvements. This article investigates a set of behavioural consequences of such reforms, which have been claimed by the blame avoidance literature, but have never been subjected to systematic empirical analysis. In particular, the article examines how a reform of agencification influences the propensity of agency managers to blame the political principals when the agency is subject to public criticism. Furthermore, it examines how the reform influences the blaming rhetoric of ministers and MPs. To evaluate such reform effects systematically, the article introduces a new empirical approach and illustrates the utility of the approach in a case study of the transformation of the national Danish railway company from 1995 to 2007.

AbstractBlame avoidance has often been claimed to be an important rationale behind changes in the organisation of the public sector, but very few studies have examined whether and how public attribution of responsibility is actually affected by such reforms. For instance, how do changes in the formal allocation of authority affect public attribution of blame when things go wrong? Is the effect immediate or delayed? To advance our understanding of such questions, this paper presents an analysis of blame and credit attribution in more than 1,200 newspaper articles about health-care-related issues in Norway before and after the major Norwegian hospital reform from 2002. The central empirical finding of the article is that central state-level authorities in Norway were attributed less blame in media coverage of health-care problems after the reform than before the reform. The shift is delayed, but substantial and robust to various modifications in model estimations.

This article investigates regional officials' use of blame‐shifting rhetoric in times of heated public criticism of unpopular regional policy decisions. Based on a content coding of nearly 500 political accounts from elected regional officials it is shown that "it's the central government's fault" is the most frequently used excuse when regional officials publicly defend unpopular decisions to cut public health care. The article finds that this excuse is used more by regional leaders (mayors and chairmen of regional boards) than by other elected officials and that partisan competition affects how often this excuse is used.

According to Jones and Baumgartner's disproportionate information processing model, it is crucial to study fluctuations in congressional attention over time and across policy issues to understand congressional policy decisions including decisions on the federal budget. Drawing on classical ideas about reelection‐oriented behavior, on the one hand, and the blocking power of federal agencies, on the other, this paper extends and specifies the attention‐spending predictions of the disproportionate information processing model. Specifically, spending effects of congressional attention shifts are argued to be crucially dependent on both the spending preferences expressed by the U.S. public and on pressure from spending advocates. An empirical evaluation of the association between changes in congressional attention measures and federal budget appropriations across 12 spending domains and 33 years (1970–2003) supports this conditional hypothesis derived from the extended disproportionate information processing model.

Using the theoretical framework formulated by Baumgartner and Jones in a most similar systems study of Danish civil defense and Danish national home guard policy from 1949 to 2003, this article shows how particular subsystem characteristics affect the magnitude and frequency of policy punctuations. Despite very similar starting points, the two subsystems have experienced radically different policy evolutions since they were created back in 1948 and 1949. The explanation, it is argued, is to be found in a combination of Baumgartner and Jones' model of issue definitions and conflict expansion on the one hand, and some particular institutional differences in the foundation of the two subsystems on the other. Hence, the aim of the article is to demonstrate that in a long‐term perspective, certain institutional choices not only enhance stability but also increase the likelihood of future conflict expansions and policy punctuations, given the dynamic model of the policymaking process provided by Baumgartner and Jones.

How does the institutional context affect government responses to fiscal austerity? Despite the 'institutional turn' in political science, we still possess an incomplete understanding of the relationship between a core aspect of the institutional setting of countries-namely institutional fragmentation-and the policy consequences of fiscal pressure. The article advances research on this question by integrating theories on the blame-avoidance effect of institutional fragmentation with theories on the effect of party constituencies on social policies. The result is a set of novel hypotheses about the conditional effects of institutional fragmentation that are tested empirically on quantitative time series data on unemployment protection from 17 advanced democracies. The analyses show that institutional fragmentation is an important determinant of government responses to fiscal austerity, but the effect depends on the partisan composition of the government. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]